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No. 8483 
In the Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
N. J. MEAGHER, JR., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EQUITY OIL CoMPANY, a corporation, et al., 
Defenda;nts. 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO THE ANSWERING BRIEF 
FILED BY WEBER OIL COMPANY. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
A. Before replying to the Weber Brief, we desire to 
define .a few phrases which will be used herein. 
(1) Mention will be made of the "Dunford Decree," 
by which we mean the decree entered by Judge Dunford 
upon the second trial of the quiet title suit. The so-called 
"Dunford Decree" was affirmed by this Court. The Dun-
ford Decree is set forth as Appendix B in the Meagher 
Opening Brief. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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2 
of Law, upon which the Dunford Decree is based, are set 
forth as Appendix A thereof. The opinion of this Court 
affirming the Dunford Decree is Appendix ·C. 
(2) When interests in the lease are referred to, we 
are speaking of the lessee's rights, as to oil, under the 
lease. As used herein, the terms "lessee's rights" and 
''interest in the lease'' refer to what are sometimes called 
"working interests" or" operating rights." Since the own-
ers of royalties ~IEt entitled to 18¥2% of the production, 
it follows that ~%of the production is available for 
the owners of the working interests. Thus when we say 
that Meagher acquired the former Stock Half of the 
'-./ ~ lease from Stock, we mean, ~ims of production, that y Meagher is entitled to lf2 of %, i.e., 40.75% of pro-
duction. Similarly, when we refer to the Phebus Half 
of the lease we are speaking of the right of its owners 
to 40.75% of production. Doubtless this Court under-
stands our meaning in using these terms, but due to the 
remarkable arithmetical presentation contained in the 
Weber Brief, we wish to define these terms. 
B. Turning to the affirmative argun1ents presented 
by Weber, it is revealing to note that the heart of the 
Weber argmnent is the pren1ise that under the Dunford 
Decree, as affir1ned by this Court, the ~Ieaghers were not 
awarded one-half of the lease but only obtained one-
quarter. They argue that the Dunford Decree did not 
award the entire former Stock Half of the le-ase to the 
Meaghers, but only one-half of the former -Stock Half. In 
terms of production, they argue that the Meaghers did not 
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become entitled to 40.75·% of p-roduction, but only % of 
40.75%. They argue that Stock and Juhan were awarded 
the other half of the former Stock Half. Then they urge 
that since, by the Dunford Decree, the 'Meaghers got half 
of the Stock Half, and Stock and Juhan got one-quarter 
of the whole, the remaining half of the entire lease, i.e., 
the Phebus Half, belongs to Weber. 
This entire argument rests upon W Hber 's construction 
of the Dunford Decree. Thus the fundamental issue is, 
what did the Dunford Decree award to the Meaghers ~ The 
Meaghers contend the Dunford Decree and the decision of 
this Court affirming it make it crystal clear that Stock 
transferred everything he had to Meagher. Since Stock's 
interest at the time of his transfer to Meagher is conceded 
by all and was held by this Court to have been one-half of 
the lease, we submit that there is no basis whatsoever to 
support the Weber contention. Once this point is deter-
Inined, Weber's argument is revealed as a mere effort to 
create arithmetical confusion in the hope of salvaging 
something from a lost cause. 
2. CONCERNING WEBER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
A. In the second paragraph of Weber's Brief, the 
following sentence appears: 
"Weber Oil Company admittedly owns the Phebus 
Half.'' 
The same assumption is made throughout the Brief. It is 
not a fact. Perhaps Stock and Juhan admit that Weber 
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owns half of the working interest. But the Meaghers do 
not. It is true that the Meaghers admit they do not 
claim an interest in the Phebus Half. However, to the 
extent the total claims of all defendants exceed one-half 
of the lease, the Meaghers do and consistently have resisted 
such claims. Although the Meaghers do not claim to own 
the Phebus Half, they certainly do claim to own all of 
the former Stock Half. They are indifferent with respect 
to the ownership of the Phebus Half. This is a far cry 
from an admission by the Meaghers that Weber owns 
the Phebus Half. 
B. Weber's statement of facts (p. 3) states: 
''There is no appeal or cross appeal taken from the 
ruling dated October 14, 1955. '' 
This is misleading. The ruling of October 14, 1955 
was nothing but a memorandum decision filed by the trial 
judge after considering the arguments and briefs of the 
parties with respect to the motions for summary judg-
ment. Mter the ruling of October 14th, the !!eaghers 
and Weber filed proposed forn1s of decree to formalize 
the ruling. This procedure has been consistently followed 
throughout the 12 years of tl1is litigation. In nearly every 
instance, after a ruling "~as announced by the court, the 
parties have proposed an order or decree to formally 
finalize it. The san1e procedure 'Yas adopted here after 
the ruling of October 14th. The fact that the forn1al 
Interlocutory Judgn1ent and Decree, based on that ruling, 
was not entered until Decen1ber 13, 1955, is merely be-
cause none of the parties 'vere satisfied 'vi th the proposed 
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decree submitted by the others. Each filed written objec-
tions to the proposals of its adversaries, and it took from 
October 14th to December 13th to settle the form of the 
decree. 
C. Weber's statement of facts (p. 5) states: 
"The court in its rulings on motions dated October 14, 
1955 (R. 213-215 at page 214) concludes that Equity 
Oil Company appears only as a 'stakeholder.' " 
If Weber means that the lower court has determined 
that Equity appears in the case ·only as a stakeholder, we 
must dispute Weber's effort to gain something for its 
parent -company. It is the Meagher position that while 
the lower court has recognized that Equity asserts that 
it is only a stakeholder, there has been no ruling by the 
lower court that such is the ultimate and final status 
of Equity. 
As stated above, we have asked this Court to modify 
the Interlocutory Decree hy ruling that Equity is a real 
party in interest and a principal with respect to the 
activities of the defendants and is not limited in its status 
to that of mere stakeholder. Alternatively, if this Court 
deems the issue to be ~beyond the scope of this appeal, we 
have asked it to so declare in such manner as will not 
preclude plaintiffs from raising the issue in the course 
of the further proceedings below. 
D. The Weber Brief correctly states that a quitclaim 
deed from the Senior Meaghers to their children, dated 
May 10, 1954, was given shortly before this action was 
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commenced. However, it should also be noted that under 
a prior quitclaim deed the Senior Meaghers transferred 
the same interest to their children on January 27, 1948 
(Exhibit A-22 in District Court No. 2238). The second 
quitclaim merely confirms the former. Thus the fact is 
that the transfer to the Meagher children goes back to 
1948. 
3. CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 1, NAMELY, THAT ''WEBER 
OIL COMPANY SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUT OF THE AC-
TION WITH A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOR AS TO 
THE TITLE THAT IT AD:MITTEDLY OWNS." 
A. First, we note that no argument at all is presented 
for dismissing Weber out of the action. Weber is one 
of the owners of the lease. Through its agent Equity, it 
has operated the property. Weber's basic obligation to 
account to the Meaghers has been recognized by the decree 
against Weber's agent, but there has been no attempt at 
this stage of the litigation to finally and precisely adjud~ 
icate Weber's ultimate obligations. Thus there is no 
reason whatsoever to ·dismiss \\: eber ··out of the action.'' 
B. Second, contrary to \Y-eber's assertion, the In-
terlocutory Decree does recognize that '"\'Y-eber is en-
titled to an interest in the lease. It recites that Stock 
transferred his half to ~Ieagher; then it recites that 
Juhan acquired the Phebus Half; then it recites that 
the various defendants (Juhan, Stock, Equity and Weber) 
have made transfers of the Phebus Half bet,Yeen thenl-
selves; then it reeites that those transfers are valid 
against the Meaghers so far as they rela·te to the Phebus 
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Half only. Finally, in the order which follows these 
recitals, the Interlocutory Decree adjudicates (1) that the 
Meaghers own half of the lease, and (2) that the defend-
ants (including Weber) own the other half of the lease. 
Thus the Interlocutory Decree does grant Weber's 
motion for summary judgment with respect to Weber's 
interest in the lease to the extent that Weber has an 
interest. 
C. The argument under Weber's Point 1 goes beyond 
the above two matters. It asserts that Weber ''admit-
tedly'' owns half of the lease. This is not true. But on 
this false assertion the Weber argument proceeds on the 
theory that Weber should now be awarded a one-half 
interest in the lease. Since the Dunford Decree awarded 
Stock and Juhan a one-quarter interest, the purpose of 
the Weber contention is to reduce the Meagher interest 
from one-half to a quarter. 
In subdivision A of ·Section 2 of this brief, we have 
noted that regardless of what the defendants may ''admit'' 
between themselves, the Meaghers certainly do not and 
never have admitted that Weber owns one-half of the 
lease. The Meaghers do admit that they claim no interest 
in the Phebus Half. But the Meaghers do not admit 
that Weber owns it. Of course, such an admission, even 
if made, would give Weber no title. From the fact that 
the Meaghers assert no interest in the Phebus Half, it 
does not follow that they .concede that Weber owns it. 
D. This section of the Weber Brief seeks to charge 
the Meaghers with some default for failure to appeal from 
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that portion of the Dunford Decree which awards one-
quarter of the lease to Stock and Juhan. But whether 
the Dunford Decree does or does not correctly delineate 
the quantum of the Stock-Juhan interest in the Phebus 
half is of no concern to the Meaghers for the reasons 
stated above. The importance of the Dunford Decree to 
the Meaghers lies in its clear award of a one-half interest 
in the entire lease to the ~1eaghers. 
E. The Weber Brief also seeks to reach its astounding 
arithmetical non sequitur by urging that only the Stock 
Half of the lease was involved in the Dunford quiet title 
suit. The argument suggests that if only the Stock Half 
was involved in that suit the award of one-half to the 
Meaghers would be one-half of the Stock Half, and so, one-
quarter of the whole. The answer to this is that the 
entire Sheridan Lease was the subject matter of the quiet 
title suit. 
Juhan himself brought the lease into that litigation 
by his Answer. This pleading sets up the entire lease, 
claims ownership of all of it, and prays adjudication 
accordingly. The entire lease "~as before the court. The 
Meaghers clailned only the half they obtained from Stock. 
Juhan and the parties he represented clain1ed the entire 
lease. Juhan and Stock failed in their efforts to wrest the 
Stock Half from the ~leaghers. No"~ they argue that only 
the Stock 1-Ialf 'v-as in litigation. 
The fallaey of Weber's premise is disclosed by the 
Dunford Decree and the decision of this Court affirming 
it. The Dunford Decree in a"~arding half of the lease 
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to Meagher and one-quarter to Stock and Juhan, certainly 
could not have done so unless more than the Stock Half 
was before the court. 
For Weber to now seek an award of one-half of the 
lease is to defy the Dunford Decree unless Weber proves 
that it obtained an additional interest, either from Stock 
or Juhan, or from the Meaghers. There is neither proof 
nor contention that Weber ever obtained any interest 
through the Meaghers. Thus whatever Weber has must 
have come from ~Stock or Juhan. It is therefore neces-
sarily limited to a share in the Phe1bus. Half. 
Nothing would please the defendants more than a series 
of judicial decrees which would award 50% to Meagher, 
25:% to Stock and Juhan and 50% to Weber (a total of 
125%). With such -confusion they ·well might exhaust 
the oil before the Meaghers could clarify the mess. We 
are confident that this Court will not be misled into such 
an ''overissue.'' 
F. Since the complete answer to Weber's Point 1 is 
contained in the Dunford Decree and the decision of this 
Court affirming it, we shall set forth a few of the perti-
nent clauses from the Dunford Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree and from this Court's Opinion (emphasis added): 
Findings: 
'' 35. On October 21, 1944, by document A30, de-
fendant Stock transferred to plaintiff Meagher all of 
his right, title and interest in the lease as modified, 
by which transfer 'Meagher .acquired an undivided 
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one half interest in the lessee's rights with respect 
to oil in the 440 acre parcel.'' 
0 onclusions: 
''B. With respect to the 440-acre parcel : . . . 
'' 4. Meagher owns an undivided one-half interest 
in the lessee's rights with respect to oil under the 
lease Al as modified. . . . 
"5. Defendant Juhan and assigns, whose respec-
tive interests are hereafter set forth, own all of the 
said lessee's rights with respect to gas and an un-
divided one-half of the said lessee's rights with 
respect to oil. . . . 
''12. The aforesaid interests of Juhan and his 
assigns in said lessee's rights referred to in Con-
clusion B5 above are owned as follows: ... 
'' (b) Juhan owns an undivided three-sixteenths 
with respect to oil. . . . 
''(d) Stock owns an undivided one-sixteenth 
with respect to oil. . . . 
"(f) Weber Oil ~Company owns an undivided 
one-fourth with respect to oil. 
'' 13. The cone 1 usions herein are not res judicata 
with resp·ect to Weber Oil Company, but transfers 
to it .are noted to delineate interests owned by those 
who are parties to this action. . . . '' 
Decree: 
"2. Plaintiff, N. J. ~Ieagher, is the owner of all 
rights, titles and interests in and to that certain 
real p-roperty ... 
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"Subject to : . . . 
'' ( 3) An oil and gas lease dated June 4, 1924, .. . 
as modified by an agreement dated May 21, 1927, .. . 
'' 4. The interests of the parties hereto in and to 
the aforesaid oil and gas lease are decreed to be as 
follows: 
"Plaintiff N. J. Meagher owns an undivided one-
half interest in the lessee's rights with respect to oil. 
''Defendant Joe T. Juhan owns ... an undivided 
three-sixteenths interest in the lessee's rights with 
respect to oil. 
"Defendant Paul Stock owns ... an undivided one-
sixteenth interest in the lessee's rights with respect 
to oil.'' 
Supreme Court Opinion: 
'' [1] Since our former decision, three claims were 
allowed to be brought into the case: ... 2) Stock's, 
by counterclaim, to assert a one-half interest in oper-
ating rights in 440 acres, in opposition to Meagher's 
identical claim; and 3) Meagher's, by amended reply, 
to claim ownership of such interest by transfer from 
Stock. Working rights in the 440 spring from a 1924 
oil and gas lease, modified in 1927. By mesne con-
veyance, Stock and Phebus each became owner of a 
half interest therein. Meagher claims nothing through 
Phebus, but claims a one-half interest through Stock's 
'release', principal subject of this suit . . . 
''The lower court, on the evidence, held this instru-
ment transferred Stock's interest to Meagher. We 
affirm such holding.'' 
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The entire structure of the Weber Brief is predicated 
upon the p.remise that the Dunford Decree and its affirm-
ance did not award Stock's interest to Meagher but only 
awarded him one-half thereof. We submit that this con-
struction of the Dunford Decree is so fantastic that it is 
frivolous. 
4. CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 2, NAMELY, THAT "THE IN-
TERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DECEMBER 13, 
1955, IS VOID AS TO WEBER OIL COMPANY." 
In arguing this point Weber contends that the ruling 
of October 14, 1955 constituted a final judgment. The 
argument continues that time for appeal commenced on 
October 14th and not on December 13th, which is the date 
the Interlocutory Judgment and Decree was entered to 
formalize said ruling. 
A. The Weber argument refers to Rule 56 which sets 
forth summary judgment procedure. The V\7" eber Brief 
says: 
''No findings are required and the judgment so 
entered is final, except as provided in subdivision (d) 
of the rule. '' 
How can it be said that dno findings are required" 
when the express instructions of the court contained in 
Rule 56 (d) directs the court to specify the facts which 
appear without substantial controversy~~ The ruling of 
.,, l n discussing the court's duty under Rule 56 (d), \,. ol. 6 
Moore's Federal Practice at p. 2306 states that this rule puts a 
co1npulsory duty upon the trial court to enter an order specifying 
the facts which appear \vithout substantial controversy. 
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October 14th does not purport to set forth such facts. It 
merely announces the conclusions of the trial judge as 
does any memorandum of decision. Thereafter, if it is 
a case which requires recitals or findings or other formal-
ization, it is established practice for the parties to present 
the documents they propose for this purpose. If the 
Meaghers had not done so, we would now be confronted 
with a proper contention by Weber that the ruling is 
defective because it does not specify the facts which 
appear without substantial controversy. The specification 
of .such facts in a summary proceeding is tantamount 
to the findings of fact in an ordinary proceeding. Until 
these specifications are set forth, the appellate court is 
without means of determining whether summary proceed-
ings were proper. The very concept of summary pro-
ceedings is that the conclusions made therein are based 
upon uncontroverted facts, and for that reason can he 
summarily made. 
B. There is substantial authority to guide the Court 
in determining whether a particular judicial pronounce-
ment constitutes a judgment or a mere memorandum of 
decision which will be formally finalized at a later time. 
The rule is that the Court's prevailing practice is de-
terminative of this question. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bedford 
(1945) 325 U.S. 283, 89 L.Ed. 1611; 
In re Forstner Chain Corporation (C.A.lst 1949) 
177 F.2d 572; 
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Peoples Book v. Fed. Reserve Bank of San FraJY~r. 
cisco ( C.A.9th 1945) 149 F.2d 850; 
Wright v. Gibson, et al. (C.A.9th 1942) 128 F.2d 
865. 
In the Forstner case, supra, the court said: 
"An opinion is not itself a judgment, even though 
it contains conclusions of fact or of law, and fore-
shadows how the judge intends to dispose of the case. 
Not infrequently, however, there is tacked on at the 
end of an opinion a sentence in mandatory language 
such as : 'The complaint is dismissed.' In the under-
standing and practice of the particular court, this 
concluding sentence may ;be the final judgment, the 
concluding judicial act or pronouncement disposing of 
the case, to be entered by the clerk forthwith. But not 
necessarily so. * * * If it is the practice of the court 
to pronounce judgment in a more formal manner, in 
a separate document entitled 'Judgment,' then the 
concluding sentence at the end of the opinion amounts 
to no more than a direction to the clerk for the 
preparation of the final judgn1ent on behalf of the 
court; the forn1al judgment ''ill then be signed or 
initialed by the judge or issued in the name of the 
court under the attestation of the clerk (whatever is 
the local practice), and not lmtil then will the clerk 
make the entry of the judgment in the civil docket in 
accordance with Rule 79(a)." 
In the above case the c.ourt concluded that the prevailing 
practice of the court did not conten1plate entry of a more 
formal document. However, in the Bedford case, supra, 
the Supreme Court of the United States held that a ruling 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
of the Second Circuit which concluded with the phrase 
"The order of the Tax Court is reversed" did not con-
stitute a judgment, since the prevailing practice of the 
Second Circuit was to finalize such rulings in formal 
documents. The Supreme Court stated: 
''The Rules would have to be far less artistic than 
they are to warrant us in holding that the Circuit 
Court of Appeals has consistently misinterpreted some 
of its own Rules. Whether the announcement of an 
opinion and its entry in the docket amounts to a judg-
ment for purposes of appeal or whether that must 
await some later formal act, ought not to be decided 
on nice-spun argumentation in disregard of the judi-
cial habits of the court whose judgment is called into 
question, of the bar practicing before it, of the clerk 
who embodies its procedural traditions, as well as in 
conflict with the assumption of the reviewing court.'' 
Thus to determine whether the October 14th ruling con-
stitutes a judgment, the p-revailing practice of the court 
and of the bar must be examined. 
In the instant case the practice 1s clear. The record 
discloses that throughout the many years of this litigation 
substantially all of the rulings rendered by the trial judge 
have been subsequently finalized by formal order proposed 
by one or both of the parties. This has been done on at 
least two occasions by Weber itself. We refer to a ruling 
of Judge Tuckett following the hearing on Meaghers' 
request for a temporary injunction, and also to another 
ruling of Judge Tuckett with respect to a motion to dis-
miss various portions of the complaint. In the latter 
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instance, the Judge's memorandum of ·decision was also 
entitled "Rulings on Motions" and was dated December 
15, 1954. The formal order finalizing the ruling was pre-
sented by Mr. Gustin, as counsel for Weber and Equity, 
and was signed on December 21, 1954. In the case of 
the ruling on the motion for temporary injunction, Judge 
Tuckett prepared and filed a minute entry .setting forth 
a memorandum of his decision on May 20, 1954. It was 
not until September 23, 1954 that the order proposed 
by Mr. Gustin, formally finalizing this pronouncement of 
the court, was entered. 
With respect to the October 14, 1955 ruling, it is obvious 
that Weber must have viewed it as a mere memorandum 
because it presented its form of judgment with respect 
to the matter after the ruling was entered. 
Examination of the correspondence between Judge 
Tuckett and counsel immediately after the ruling of 
October 14th was entered proves beyond any question that 
everyone recognized the practice of formalizing rulings. 
This correspondence begins with the follo·wing letter from 
plain tiffs ' counsel to Judge Tuckett (a copy of this letter 
was sent to each counsel for defendants) : 
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''The Honorable R. L. Tuckett 
Judge of the District Court 
Vernal, Utah 
October 20, 1955. 
Meagher v. Equity 
No. 3228-Civil 
Dear Judge Tuckett: 
It goes without saying that we were pleased to 
receive a copy of your decision expressed In the 
'Ruling on Motions' dated October 14th. 
We are preparing and will .shortly submit to you 
formal documents to finalize the decision.* 
Yours very truly, 
H. VanDam 
Gilbert ~c. Wheat'' 
Then, on October 22, 19·55, Mr. Gustin wrote the fol-
lowing letter to all counsel of record (a copy was sent 
to Judge Tuckett) : 
"Mr. Herbert Van Dam 
Mr. Gilbert C. Wheat 
Mr. Burton W. Musser 
Mr. Richard Downing 
Mr. Oliver W. Steadman 
Octo her 22, 1955 
Re: Meagher et al. v. 
Equity Oil Company et al. 
Gentlemen: 
We have this day handed to Judge Tuckett a form 
of judgment of which the enclosure is a copy. Judge 
Tuckett has requested us to inform all counsel that 
•Emphasis added. 
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objections to the enclosure should be made within ten 
days from the date hereof.* 
Very truly yours, 
Gustin, Richards & Mattsson 
ByHarleyW. Gustin'' 
Three days later, counsel for plaintiffs wrote the fol-
lowing letter to Judge Tuckett (a copy of this letter and 
of the proposed decree mentioned therein was sent to each 
of the counsel for the defendants) : 
'' Hon. R. L. Tuckett 
District Court Judge 
Provo, Utah 
October 25, 1955 
Re : Meagher et al v. 
Equity Oil Company et al 
Dear Judge Tuckett: 
We enclose original and copy of form of interlocu-
tory judgment 'vhich "~e deem appropriate in this 
case. We assume you will file the original with the 
court Clerk, and keep a copy for your personal use. 
With Mr. Gustin's letter of October 22, 1955, carbon 
copy of which was sent to you, we received copies 
of the form of judgment left with you on that date 
by him, and 've noted your request that objections 
to the proposed judgment be made within ten days 
from the date of the letter. \\T e shall file our objec-
tions within the tiine stated. 
And may ",.e suggest that counsel for defendants 
be allowed ten days fron1 this date to file objections 
to our proposed for1n of judgn1ent, and that your 
•Emphasis added. 
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Honor set a date for hearing· at which the form of 
judgment can be settled.* 
Very truly yours, 
Gilbert C. Wheat 
Herbert Van Dam'' 
Thereafter written objections to all proposed decrees 
submitted by adverse counsel were filed in behalf of all 
parties. 
The foregoing is proof positive of the fact that all 
concerned considered the October 14th ruling to be a mere 
memorandum of decision. 
The letters quoted above do not appear in the record 
on appeal since plaintiffs had no idea that the defendants 
would repudiate the procedure which they themselves 
adopted. If any point is made of the fact that we have 
thus exceeded the record, we request that this brief be 
deemed a motion to augment the record on appeal by the 
quoted correspondence. (Rule 75(h).) 
5. CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 3, WHICH RELATES TO THE 
SCOPE OF APPROPRIATE ACTION BY THIS COURT. 
The manner in which Weber argues its Point 3 points 
up the necessity for the Meaghers to urge this Court 
to make it clear, when it writes its opinion, that certain 
issues are not determined by the Interlocutory Decree. 
Alternatively, if this Court considers that those issues 
*Emphasis added. 
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could and should have been determined by the Interlocu-
tory Decree, the Meaghers request appropriate modifica-
tion of the decree. 
The issues to which we refer are (1) the ultimate 
responsibility of We·ber, Stock and Juhan, and (2) the 
status of Equity Oil Company. 
The Meagher Opening Brief points out that the Inter-
locutory Decree acts only upon Equity. If it is deemed a 
determination that the same relief cannot be afforded to 
the Meaghers against Weber, Stock and Juhan, who are 
Equity's admitted principals, then the Interlocutory De-
cree should be modified to correct such error. However 
if this Court considers that the Interlocutory Decree 
merely defers any award which will ultimately be made 
against Weber, Stock and Juhan, then the Meaghers 
respectfully ask this Court, when it renders its decision, 
to make that interpretation clear, so that the Meaghers 
will not be confronted with the contention that the failure 
of the Interlocutory Decree to act upon \Veber, Stock and 
Juhan precludes the lower court from doing so in further 
proceedings. 
The same applies to the status of Equity Oil Com-
pany. To prove that our apprehensions with respect to 
this issue are ""'ell taken~ note the following statement 
which appears on p. ~0 of Weber's Brief: 
'· A<hnittedly the rulings of October 14, 1955, are 
interlocutory as to Equity Oil Conlp,any in its status 
of stakeholder and as to it there is no appeal until 
a final judgtnent." 
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This statement sounds like a concession that. the final 
status of Equity Oil Company remains to be determined. 
But the very next point of Weber's Brief argues that 
the Interlocutory Decree does hold that the status of 
Equity Oil Company is merely that of stakeholder. 
In Weber's Brief the Meaghers were criticized for 
pointing out, in their Appendices, items in the record 
which prove Equity to be something more than a mere 
stakeholder. We presume Weber refers to the uncontro-
verted evidence that Dougan agreed to finance the litigation 
against Meagher as far back as 1945. We also presume 
they refer to the several written declarations of trust 
showing the joint association between all of the defend-
ants in their efforts to oust the Meaghers. We also 
presume they refer to the fact that Equity dealt with 
the property .as an owner even after it had assigned all 
of its interest therein to Weber. 
But after criticizing the Meaghers for bringing this 
Court's attention to these portions of the record, we find 
this statement on p. 22 of Weber's Brief: 
''Plaintiffs do not point to anything in the record 
that would relieve them from the solemn pronounce-
ment of the stakeholder status of Equity Oil Com-
pany." 
If we understand this statement they mean that the 
Interlocutory Decree holds that Equity is a stakeholder 
and nothing else. The Meaghers do not agree with this 
interpretation of the Interlocutory Decree. We consider 
that the Interlocutory Decree merely holds that Equity 
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. 
Is surely a stakeholder and may be something more. If 
we are in error in so interpreting the Interlocutory De-
cree, we ask this Court to modify the Interlocutory Decree 
on this point and to hold, on the undisputed evidence 
which is before it, that Equity is more than a stake-
holder. On the other hand, if we are correct that the 
Interlocutory Decree holds that Equity is a stakeholder 
and also may be something more, we ask this Court to 
make this point clear. 
On p. 21 of Weber's Brief, in its reference to our 
request that this Court make clear the meaning of the 
Interlocutory Decree, either by modification or by inter-
pretation, the Weber Brief unwittingly bares its true 
philosophy of the function of this Court. They say ''we 
submit that such is not the function of the appellate 
court." In other words, in Weber's view, this Court 
must hear the appeals with its head in the sand. It 
knows that additional litigation is inevitable, but, according 
to Weber, it must do nothing to assist and guide the 
lower court. We do not agree with Weber that it is 
beyond the function of this Court to clarify the issues, 
instruct and guide the lo,Yer court and in all other re-
spects facilitate the efficient adininistration of the case. 
6. CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 4, NAMELY, THE CONTEN-
TION THAT ''THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DE-
CREE WAS AN IMPOSITION UPON THE TRIAL COURT.'' 
A. In discussing ''T eher ~s Point 4, the ''T eber Brief 
critir.izes the Interlocutory Decree, saying that it pre-
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sumes to be a determination of disputed matters of fact. 
What facts were disputed~ Weber specifies none. There 
were none. Each fact recited in the Interlocutory Decree 
is supported by documentary evidence which was before 
Judge Tuckett and as to which no denial or dispute has 
been offered. In making this statement we recognize that 
it was necessary for Judge Tuckett to interpret the Dun-
ford Decree and the decision of this Court affirming that 
decree. If the Dunford Decree, as affirmed, does not 
mean that the Meaghers own the former Stock Half in 
the Sheridan Lease, then of course the legal premise upon 
which the Interlocutory Decree is based is faulty. Else-
where in this brief we answer the contentions of Weber 
concerning the meaning of the Dunford Decree. But the 
Interlocutory Decree involves no controverted fact. 
For instance, paragraph numbered 1 of the decree, 
immediately following the recitals, states that the Dunford 
Decree adjudicated that the Meagher children own half 
the lease as against Juhan and Stock. Then paragraph 
numbered 2 of the Interlocutory Decree holds that the 
Dunford Decree concludes and is binding upon Weber 
so far as concerns any claim of Weber with respect to 
the Meaghers' half interest in the lease. These legal con-
clusions contained in the Interlocutory Decree are dis-
puted by Weber in this appeal. However, the mere fact 
that Weber does not agree with Judge Tuckett's interpre-
tation of the Dunford Decree does not mean that the 
facts, upon which he based those legal conclusions, were 
disputed. 
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B. The Weber Brief says that the Meaghers ''com-
plain of their own handiwork'' because the Interlocutory 
Decree is in the form proposed by the Meaghers. The 
answer to this is that the Meaghers understood the mem-
orandum decision as being directed only to Equity Oil 
Company. Accordingly, we prepared the Interlocutory 
Decree in conformity therewith. We have previously 
pointed out that if Judge Tuckett thereby intended to 
eliminate Weber, Stock and Juhan as parties who are 
responsible to account to the Meaghers for their opera-
tions, the Interlocutory Decree is in error and should be 
modified. However, if Judge Tuckett merely intended to 
defer determination of the responsibility of Weber, Stock 
and Juhan, then no error has been committed. In any 
event the Meaghers earnestly request this Court to state 
the true interpretation of the Interlocutory Decree for the 
lower court's guidance in the subsequent proceedings. 
C. Weber complains that the Interlocutory Decree fails 
to recognize 'Veber's rights under its motion for summary 
judgment. We submit that this is not the case. The 
Interlocutory Decree points out that the various assign-
ments between the defendants are ineffective insofar as 
they purport to involYe the for1ner Stock Half. But the 
recitals also point out that these transfers of interest 
between the defendants a.re valid against the ~I eaghers 
so far as they relate only to the for1ner Phebus Half 
interest. The conclusion required by these recitals is 
stated in paragraph nwn·bered 3 of the Interlocutory 
Decree which states that defendants Weber, Juhan and 
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Stock own the remaining half interest in the lease as 
against any and all adverse claims of the Meaghers. Thus 
the Interlocutory Decree does recognize Weber's interest. 
D. The Weber Brief on p. 23 states that the recitals 
in the Interlocutory Decree depart from the findings of 
the Supreme Court as stated in its opinion affirming the 
Dunford Decree. Weber quotes a sentence from that 
opinion which states that Juhan has transferred his in-
terest to Equity and it to Weber, and also states that 
neither Equity nor Weber were litigants in that action. 
Then the Weber Brief points out that the Interlocutory 
Decree in the instant action recites that Juhan assigned 
portions of whatever interest he had to Paul Stock and 
to Equity Oil Company. 
Weber urges that this Court made a finding, which 
modified the Dunford Decree to the effect that Juhan 
assigned all of his interest to Equity and it to Weber. It 
is then argued that the Interlocutory Decree is incon-
sistent in finding that a portion of Juhan's interest went 
to Stock, or remained in Juhan. 
The Meaghers believe that the sentence from the opinion 
of this Court to which the Weber Brief refers was not 
intended as an award to anyone but merely notes that 
persons who were not parties to that action, namely, 
Equity and Weber, may have interests in the lease. The 
Meaghers do not believe that this Court intended by that 
statement to deprive Juhan and Stock of the interests 
which were awarded to them (out of the Phe'bus Half) 
by the Dunford Decree. Furthermore, the ''all-for-one, 
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one-for-all" agreement was not in the record when this 
Court considered the Dunford Decree. But none of this 
has any bearing on the Meaghers. If it were not for 
the "one-for-all, all-for-one" agreement, defendants Juhan 
and Stock would have been the aggrieved parties if this 
Court on the former appeal had intended to hold that all 
interests in the lease, excepting the half Meagher obtained 
from Stock, were to be awarded to Weber or to Equity. 
We do not think that such was the intention of this 
Court. But even if it had been it would not affect the 
Meaghers because there is no suggestion in the opinion 
of this Court that the Meaghers did not receive the entire 
former Stock Half. Therefore, any reference to what 
Juhan may have done with respect to what remained must 
necessarily relate to dealings with the former Phebus 
Half. 
Again we come to the only real question presented by 
the Weber Brief, namely, did the Dunford Decree, as 
affirmed by this Court, hold that the Meaghers obtained 
the former Stock Half, or can it be "~arped into the 
construction that all the Meaghers got from Stock was 
half of the former Stock Half·? The mere statement of 
this question contains its o"""D ans"~e.r. There has never 
been any basis for the contention, and the contention has 
never been asserted, tl1at Stork transferred less than all 
he had to l\leagher. There hns neYer been any contention 
that Stock owned less than n half "~hen he 1nade the transfer 
to Meagher. rrherefore ~1eagher arquired one-half. There 
has never bPen any contention that any of the defendants 
acquired any interest thereafter fron1 the Meaghers. There-
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fore, even if the effect of the sentence from the opinion 
of this Court, quoted on p. 23 of Weber's Brief, is to 
divest Juhan of all interest and to transfer all of Juhan's 
interest to Weber via Equity, it merely means that Juhan 
and Stock are without any interest. It can have no bear-
ing on the hard-fought and finally adjudicated fact that 
the Meaghers obtained the Stock Half. Normally, this 
entire line of argument could not be asserted by Weber 
without creating conflict between it on the one hand and 
Stock and Juhan on the other. However, the record in 
the instant case discloses that each of the defendants is 
free to assert extra vag ant claims in his own behalf even 
if they conflict with claims of the other defendants. 
They are free to do so simply because they have an 
agreement that whatever any of them gets will inure 
to the benefit of the others. 
E. Section D under Point 4 of the Weber Brief asks 
why the Interlocutory Decree runs only in favor of the 
Meagher children and does not include the Senior 
Meaghers. 
N. J. Meagher, Sr. and his wife divested themselves 
of all interests in the lease by quitclaim to their children 
on January 27, 1948. They retained only a royalty in-
terest which is not involved in this appeal. (Exhibit A-22 
in District Court No. 2238.) This conveyance to the children 
was made during the pendency of the quiet title litigation 
and prior to the decision of Judge Dunford in the second 
trial thereof. In fact, this transfer to the children was 
made and recorded before any drilling operations were 
conducted on the property. 
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Having commenced the quiet title litigation in his own 
name, since he was the owner of the property when the 
complaint was filed in 1944, and having transferred the 
property pending the litigation, the suit was carried on 
in the name of N. J. !feagher, Sr. But it was made clear 
in the record that he continued the litigation in his own 
name in behalf of the true owners, his children. Defend-
ants in the quiet title suit made quite a fuss over this 
situation, but the issue was resolved in favor of the 
Meaghers. 
Having obtained a judgment for the benefit of the 
children, but having been unable to collect the fruits 
thereof from the defendants, the Senior Meaghers have 
been confronted with the problem of how long they should 
continue to act as trustees for their children. When the 
instant case for an accounting was commenced, the 
Meagher family "Tas advised that the Senior ~!eaghers 
need not participate. Accordingly, the complaint, as filed 
in the instant accounting suit, named only the four chil-
dren as parties plaintiff. Thereafter during one of the 
hearings before Judge Tuckett all defendants vociferously 
insisted that the Senior 1\Ieaghers "Tere proper and neces-
sary parties plaintiff. Plaintiffs considered this to be a 
tempest in a teapot, but consented that the Senior 
Meaghers be brought into the case if the defendants 
wanted them to be parties. Accordingly~ it 'vas so ordered. 
In viP'v of the insistPnr~ by the defendants that the 
Senior Meaghers hP n1ade parties plaintiff, it is true that 
the complaint no'v appears as though the Senior Meaghers 
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asserted some rights in the premises as distinguished 
from the rights of their children. Actually, such is not 
the case, and, since the children are now the full and 
beneficial owners of the interest Meagher Sr. acquired 
from Stock, there is no reason for the defendants to 
account to the Senior Meaghers or to make any payments 
to them. When Mr. Meagher's deposition was taken, he 
did say that he thought he personally was entitled to an 
accounting in this action. Under the circumstances we 
believe Mr. Meagher gave the correct answer in that, to 
the extent he is a party to the action, and to the extent 
he had been or still is a trustee for his children, he might 
be entitled to an accounting. Actually, we see no reason 
why the defendants should be required to make any pay-
ments to the Senior Meaghers or why they should be 
required to give an accounting to them. The Interlocu-
tory Decree does not require the defendants to account 
or make payments to the Senior Meaghers, but requires 
them to account and pay to the children. 
We cannot understand why Weber seems insistent with 
respect to this matter. Certainly, if they wish to make 
an accounting to the Senior Meaghers, their documents 
will be accepted, and if they wish to make any payments 
to the Senior Meaghers, they will receive a receipt there-
for. However, whatever dealings they may see fit to have 
with the Senior Meaghers will be only for the account 
and benefit of the children. 
F. In this portion of Weber's Brief some point is 
sought to be made based on the law that a quitclaim deed 
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does not pass an after-acquired title. Certainly, if the 
Senior Meaghers quitclaimed this property to their chil-
dren in 1948 and acquired their only title thereto at some 
later date, it is true that the quitclaim, per se, would pass 
nothing. But the title which the Senior Meaghers obtained 
from Stock was obtained by transfer in October, 1944, and 
therefore any quitclaim executed by them in 1948 to the 
same property would of course pass their title. The mere 
fact that their title was not finally adjudicated until after 
1948 has no bearing upon the fact that it was acquired 
in 1944. 
G. The Weber Brief then suggests the legal proposi-
tion that under an oil and gas lease the right of the 
lessees may be a mere license to explore. The Meaghers 
do not accept or reject this principle. We consider it 
to be immaterial. Whatever the rights of a lessee may 
be, the Meaghers, through Stock, acquired half of those 
rights. The defendants, through Phebus, acquired the 
other half. As to those rights, they were cotenants and 
if some of them develop the property, their obligation 
to account to the others is beyond dispute. Does Weber 
argue that a cotenant of an oil lease can develop the 
property to the exclusion of other co tenants? If so, we 
have yet to see the decision so holding, and certainly none 
is cited in Weber's Brief. 
H. In Section E of Weber's Point 4, the following 
state1nent appears: 
''This begs the question because it has heretofore 
been adjudicated and it is adn1itted in these pro-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
ceedings that Weber has the Phebus Half of the 
Sheridan Lease.'' 
We have stated and reiterated that although we think 
we know who owns the Phebus Half of the Sheridan 
Lease, the Meaghers are not interested therein. If Weber 
is the owner we invite counsel for Stock and Juhan to 
admit it. The Meaghers merely state and have consist-
ently stated that their title stems from the former Stock 
Half and they own all of it. 
I. In this section of the Weber Brief, with no apparent 
relevancy, they urge the admitted fact that Equity Oil 
Company openly and notoriously entered upon the prop·-
erty, drilled for and discovered oil. This is true. We 
have asserted in the prior proceedings and repeat here 
that .so long as any of the defendants had any interest 
in this oil lease it was free to enter upon the property 
openly and notoriously, .and it was free to drill and 
produce oil therefrom. Then the Weber Brief repeats a 
point strenuously urged in the prior proceedings, namely, 
that the Meaghers did not protest this activity of Equity. 
To this we answer that if the Meaghers had protested 
it would have availed them nothing because one cotenant 
can enter, drill and produce with or without the consent 
of his cotenant, and no cotenant can prevent such action.* 
Therefore any protest would have been a useless act. It 
*Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen (C.C.A. 8th) 2 Fed. (2'd) 566 · 
Davis v. Byrd, 185 S.W.2d 866; ' 
Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 152 La. 19, 92 So. 720; 
Buchanan v. Jencks, 38 R.I. 443, 96 Atl. 307. 
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is also a fact, though equally immaterial, that none of 
the defendants invited the Meaghers to participate in their 
production operations. The reason for this is clear-they 
had already determined to resist the claims of the 
Meaghers and were, at that time, resisting them actively 
in the quiet title suit. 
7. CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 5, NAMELY, THAT "THE 
FOURTH COUNT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AS AGAINST 
ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS.'' 
The Weber Brief, in nine lines, argues that the Fourth 
Count of plaintiffs' Complaint does not state a cause 
of action because of its novelty and asserts that no legal 
authority is cited. Weber ignores the theory of action 
underlying plaintiffs' Fourth Count, namely, that a fidu-
ciary who violates his trust must restore the beneficiaries' 
loss, and secondly, that one may recover damages incurred 
by reason of an intentional and wrongful interference 
with his property by another. Wherein is such theory 
of action novel~ 
In Meaghers' Opening Brief '"'e argued, citing judicial 
decisions, that taxes are proper items to be taken into 
account in determining dru11ages. ''T e recognize that none 
of the eited eases constitutes binding authority in Utah, 
but surely the decisions of other states are judicial au-
thority worthy of consideration. 
The SuprenH? Court of ~faine~ in Sidelinker v. York 
Shore Water Co. (1918) 117 Me. 52S, 108 Atl. 122 (cited 
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in our Opening Brief), clearly supports our claim that 
enhanced taxes resulting from the wrongful act of another 
are recoverable as an item of damages. In that case 
plaintiff owned valua1ble timber properties which he was 
planning to log. Defendant improperly interfered with 
his possession and, for several years, prevented the con-
templated logging operations. The only item of damage 
which plaintiff was allowed to recover was the enhanced 
property taxes which he was compelled to pay during 
the years his logging operations were interrupted by de-
fendant's wrongful act. The court recognized that if 
plaintiff had logged his property as planned, such opera-
tions would have resulted in reducing the value of the 
property; consequently, the annual property taxes would 
have been lower. Having been prevented from engaging 
in the activities which would have reduced his annual 
property taxes, plaintiff had been damaged. Therefore 
the court held that defendant was required to reimburse 
plaintiff in the amount of these enhanced taxes. 
The Sidelinker case, supra, actually applied a broader 
principle of law than is required in this case since no 
fiduciary relationship was therein involved. As we 
pointed out in our Opening Brief, this case does not 
involve a question of whether all debtors failing to pay 
their debts on time would be answerable to their creditors 
for enhanced taxes. Weber appears to urge that this 
is the contention of plaintiffs. We pointed out that 
these parties are cotenants, and as ;.;uch stand in a 
relationship of trust and confidence with reference to one 
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another. It cannot be doubted that fiduciaries must 
respond for damages caused by breach of trust. 
The instant case may involve a difficult burden of 
proof for the Meaghers. If they do not surmount it 
' the lower court will deny the claim. But this count is still 
at the pleading stage. The Meaghers merely ask the oppor-
tunity to prove their claim. They should not be deprived 
of their day in court just because the issue presents dif-
ficult problems of proof. 
8. CONCLUSION. 
The Weber Brief, when analyzed boils down to a single 
contention. It seeks to interpret the Dunford Decree and 
its affirmance as awarding to the Meaghers one-quarter 
of the lease rather than one-half. If that is what the 
Dunford Decree says and if that is what this Court 
affirmed, Weber should prevail. The reasoning by which 
the Weber Brief reaches its astonishing conclusion is so 
confusing that we fear our efforts to analyze it may 
augment that confusion. That, of course, is Weber's 
only hope. Perhaps if one ean litigate long enough, 
sooner or later son1e Judge or Court will fall into error 
which can be capitalized. 
Let us examine a fe"T of the points which surely would 
have been raised by ''Teber if their position had any 
merit. Do they attack Judge Tuckett's holding that 
W e'ber is bound by the prior adjudication' They do 
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not. They do not deny that Weber is a mere successor 
in interest to and in privity with Stock and Juhan in 
the quiet title litigation. Do they claim they are entitled 
to any interest in the Stock Half of the lease obtained 
by them before Meagher acquired it~ They do not. Do 
they claim they are entitled to any interest in the Stock 
: Half of the lease obtained by them as bona fide purchasers 
: for value after Meagher acquired it~ They do not. Do 
they claim they acquired any interest in the Stock Half 
of the lease from the Meaghers ~ They do not. Those 
are the only possible ways in which Weber could have 
obtained any interest in the Stock Half of this lease. Not 
one of those contentions has been asserted. Weber is 
, relegated to the frivolous contention that when Judge 
;·:· Dunford expressly awarded a one-half interest in the 
~· lease to Meagher, he was only awarding a one-quarter 
lJ interest. They are forced to the contention that when 
j this Court affirmed the Dunford Decree it did not know 
( what it was doing. The Meaghers confidently rest their 
~: case on the ability of this Court to construe the Dunford 
i: Decree and its own opinion affirming it. 
r·' 
•' 
Dated: April27, 1956. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HERBERT vAN DAM, 
·GILBERT ·C. WHEAT, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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